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ALI Data Privacy:  
Overview and Black Letter Text 
BY  
DANIEL J. SOLOVE* 
&  
PAUL M. SCHWARTZ** 
ABSTRACT 
In this Essay, the Reporters for the American Law Institute 
Principles of Law, Data Privacy provide an overview of the project as 
well as the text of its black letter. The Principles aim to provide a 
blueprint for policymakers to regulate privacy comprehensively and 
effectively.  
The United States has long remained an outlier in privacy law. 
While numerous nations have enacted comprehensive privacy laws, 
the U.S. has clung stubbornly to a fragmented, inconsistent patchwork 
of laws. Moreover, there long has been a vast divide between the 
approaches of the U.S. and European Union (EU) to regulating 
privacy – a divide that many consider to be unbridgeable.    
The Principles propose comprehensive privacy principles for 
legislation that are consistent with certain key foundations in the U.S. 
approach to privacy, yet that also align the U.S. with the EU. 
Additionally, the Principles attempt to breathe new life into the 
moribund and oft-criticized U.S. notice-and-choice approach, which 
has remained firmly rooted in U.S. law. Drawing from a vast array of 
privacy laws and frameworks, and with a balance of innovation, 
practicality, and compromise, the Principles aim to guide 
policymakers in advancing U.S. privacy law.     
 John Marshall Harlan Research Professor of Law, George Washington University Law 
School.  The views in this essay about the ALI Principles of Law, Data Privacy are those of 
Paul Schwartz and Daniel Solove only. The authoritative text about the meaning of the 
Principles is the main document itself, which contains comments, notes, and illustrations.   
** Jefferson E. Peyser Professor at UC Berkeley School of Law, and Director, Berkeley Center 
for Law and Technology. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Data privacy law in the United States is currently a bewildering 
assortment of many types of federal and state law that differ 
significantly from each other.1 While many countries follow the 
approach of the European Union (EU) by enacting a comprehensive 
privacy law,2 the approach of the U.S. remains highly fragmented, 
inconsistent, and gap-ridden. Calls for a new direction in U.S. privacy 
law are becoming more frequent and are emerging from all directions.3 
The path forward, however, remains quite murky. Is there a 
meaningful and practical way for U.S. privacy law to advance? Can 
U.S. privacy law become more consistent with the law of the EU 
without making a radical break from its foundations?   
These questions are ones with which scholars and policymakers 
have long struggled. It is because these questions are so difficult and 
because finding a resolution to them is so important that the American 
Law Institute decided to develop a project devoted to articulating 21st 
century concepts of privacy law, namely, the Principles of Law, Data 
Privacy (the “Principles”). It was our honor to serve as the Reporters 
for this project. The ALI’s mission is “to promote the clarification and 
simplification of the law and its better adaptation to social needs, to 
secure the better administration of justice, and to encourage and carry 
on scholarly and scientific legal work.”4 The ALI has produced a 
remarkable number of projects that have exercised a profound 
influence on the law, including the Uniform Commercial Code, the 
Model Penal Code, and various Restatements of the Law, including 
the celebrated Restatement (Second) of Torts.  
 
 
1 For a concise introduction, see DANIEL SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION 
PRIVACY LAW 36-39 (6th edition 2018). 
2 Paul M. Schwartz, Global Data Privacy: the EU Way, 94 N.Y.U. Law Review – 
(forthcoming 2019).  
3 For example, in a speech in Brussels to EU data protection commissioners, Tim Cook, CEO 
of Apple, told EU officials, “It is time for the rest of the world—including my home country—
to follow your lead.” Tim Cook, CEO, Apple, Remarks Before the International Conference 
of Data Protection & Privacy Commissioners (Oct. 24, 2018). 
4 ALI, How the Institute Works, https://www.ali.org/about-ali/how-institute-works/. 
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Before these Principles, the ALI’s only foray into privacy was the 
short section in the Restatement (Second) of Torts establishing the four 
privacy torts in 1977.5 These four torts have not proven well-suited to 
contemporary privacy problems involving organizations collecting 
and using vast amounts of personal data.6 With the Principles, the ALI 
has finally weighed in on privacy in the Twenty-First Century. The 
ALI categorizes this project as a “Principles” project. As explained by 
the ALI, “Principles are primarily addressed to legislatures, 
administrative agencies, or private actors. They can, however, be 
addressed to courts when an area is so new that there is little 
established law.”7  Accordingly, as a Principles project, the Principles 
of Law, Data Privacy seeks to provide guidance for the evolution of 
U.S. data privacy law toward a more comprehensive and coherent 
approach. The ALI approved these Principles in May 2019 following 
a seven-year process.8   
 Data privacy law, which is sometimes referred to as 
“information privacy law,” concerns the collection, use, and disclosure 
of personal data.9 The last few decades have witnessed a torrent of 
legislative, regulatory, and judicial activity regarding data privacy 
around the world. At present, 132 countries have privacy laws.10 
According to Graham Greenleaf, who tracks these developments, 
“Fifty countries have enacted new data privacy laws in the first nine 
years of this decade, an average of 5.5 per year.”11 Among the 231 
 
 
5 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652 (1977). 
6 For criticisms of the privacy torts, see Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law, 98 
Cal. L. Rev. 2007 (2010); Neil M. Richards & Daniel Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed 
Legacy, 98 Cal. L. Rev. 1887 (2010). 
7 ALI, How the Institute Works, https://www.ali.org/about-ali/how-institute-works/. 
8 The Principles were created not just by us, but also by our advisory group and many ALI 
members who contributed greatly to this project. The ALI process is a wonderful one — a 
thoughtful constructive discussion about how to craft meaningful regulation between 
practitioners, judges, and academics, among others. 
9 For a discussion of the different nomenclature used in this area of law, see Schwartz, Global 
Data Privacy, supra note 2, at --. 
10 Graham Greenleaf, Global Data Privacy Laws 2019: New Eras for International Standards, 
157 Privacy Laws & Business International Report 14 (2019).  
11 Id. at 4. 
 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3457563 
 SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, ALI DATA PRIVACY   4 
 
 
 
 
countries surveyed by Greenleaf, about 57% now have data privacy 
laws.12   
U.S. data privacy law remains an outlier among regulatory 
approaches around the world. The vast majority of countries have a 
comprehensive privacy law modeled after the law of the European 
Union (EU). The EU initially approached data privacy law with the 
Data Protection Directive of 1995.13 The Directive set out standards 
for information privacy and mandated that each member nation adopt 
a comprehensive privacy law according to its requirements.14 About 
20 years later, in 2016, in an attempt to create greater harmonization 
among the law of EU member nations, and to update its law, the EU 
passed the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).15 The GDPR 
became effective in May 2018.  The Directive and the GDPR, its 
successor, have been the most influential approach to data privacy 
worldwide.16 Most countries have enacted laws closer to the EU 
approach than to the U.S. approach. In the judgment of Greenleaf, 
“[S]omething reasonably described as ‘European standard’ data 
privacy laws are becoming the norm in most parts of the world with 
data privacy laws.”  17 
The divergence between the privacy law of the U.S. and that of the 
EU has led to significant tensions and problems for smooth transborder 
data flows and efficient commerce between EU member nations and 
the U.S.18 EU data privacy law has long required that before personal 
data about persons in the EU can be transferred to other countries, 
 
 
12 Id. at 4. 
13 European Parliament and Council Directive 95/46/EC – on the Protection of Individuals 
with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 
[hereinafter Directive]. 
14 Id. 
15 Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection 
of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of 
Such Data (May 4, 2016)[hereinafter GDPR]. 
16 Schwartz, Global Data Privacy Law, supra note 2, at --. 
17 Graham Greenleaf, The Influence of European Data Privacy Standards Outside Europe: 
Implications for Globalization of Convention 108, 2 Int’l Data Privacy L. 68, 77 (2011). 
18 For an early and important look at these issues, see PETER SWIRE & ROBERT LITAN, NONE 
OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD DATA FLOWS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN 
PRIVACY DIRECTIVE 197-202 (1998). 
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those countries must have an “adequate level of protection.”19 The EU 
has not found the United States to have an adequate level of 
protection.20 As a result, more cumbersome data transfer mechanisms 
must be used, such as the Standard Contractual Clauses, Binding 
Corporate Rules (BCRs), or the Privacy Shield Framework.21   
U.S. privacy law is currently unwieldy and conflicting. The state 
of this area of U.S. law has led many foreign nations to discount the 
protections that do exist in the U.S. New laws continue to emerge in 
many states, which further contributes to the vast patchwork of 
inconsistent laws.22 Because of these problems, advocates and industry 
have both started to push for a comprehensive federal data privacy law. 
But there remains significant skepticism that a meaningful 
compromise can be reached on a comprehensive federal law as well as 
strong doubts that U.S. privacy law can ever be brought into harmony 
with the GDPR.23    
Although this skepticism appears widely shared, we contend that 
it is possible to craft a comprehensive approach to data privacy for the 
U.S. that bridges the divide with the EU. The true proof of our thesis 
is in the Principles themselves, which we publish as part of this Essay. 
As Reporters on the Principles, we faced choices about many 
challenging and contentious privacy issues. This Essay provides an 
overview of the approaches and solutions to these issues taken in the 
Principles, and it explains why we opted for these approaches over 
others. We then present the Principles themselves. 
The Principles are not an attempt to write our ideal privacy law as 
if drafting on a blank slate. Nor is it an attempt to restate existing law. 
 
 
19 Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 106 Geo. L.J. 
115 (2017). 
20 Indeed, in a non-binding opinion in 1999, the EU’s Article 29 Working Party opined that 
the U.S. lacked adequate protection for personal data. Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 1/99 
concerning the level of data protection in the United States and the ongoing discussions 
between the European Commission and the United States 2 (Jan. 26, 1999). 
21 For an overview, see SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 1173-1203.  
22 See Matt Dumiak, Introducing state privacy legislation amidst national privacy law 
discussions, SC Magazine (May 21, 2019), at 
https://www.scmagazine.com/home/opinion/executive-insight/introducing-state-privacy-
legislation-amidst-national-privacy-law-discussions/. 
23 John Hendel, “Embarrassing”: Congress stumbles in push for a consumer privacy law, 
Politico (July 12, 2019), at https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/12/congress-consumer-
privacy-bill-1582540. 
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Instead, it is something in between. We build on foundations in 
existing law, seek fidelity to U.S. privacy law foundations, and attempt 
to advance the law progressively without clashing with core 
commitments or introducing concepts that are without precedent. 
Overall, in the Principles, we aim to demonstrate how U.S. privacy 
law can maintain its essential commitments, build upon existing 
foundations, and end up in a place that is close to the GDPR, which is 
currently the most important global privacy benchmark. The 
Principles reflect our judgment about how far U.S. law can be 
pushed—at least within the ALI process, which requires approval first 
by a group of senior advisors, the Council, and then by the Members 
as a whole. It is an interesting question as to whether we could have 
pushed further in one direction or another. We welcome this 
discussion. Privacy law is constantly evolving, and today marks just a 
single stage in the evolution of this area of law. We hope that the 
Principles contribute to this evolution as other ALI projects have done 
in their respective fields.  
We also have taken some new approaches to certain issues that 
have not yet been tried in quite the same fashion. Our primary 
contribution in this regard is to attempt to breathe new life into what 
has become known as the “notice-and-choice approach” that 
predominates much of U.S. privacy law.24 Under this approach, 
organizations provide a statement about their privacy practices 
(notice), and individuals then can exercise some form of choice about 
their data (often to opt out of certain uses or transfers).25 Numerous 
commentators have pointed out that the notice-and-choice approach 
has been ineffective, with many calling it an outright failure.26 Most 
 
 
24 For a critical account of notice-and-choice, see Schwartz & Peifer, Transatlantic Data 
Privacy Law, supra note 19, at 136-137. 
25 Id. 
26 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND 
POLICY 365 (2016)(“The notice and consent regime is a rigged game, guaranteed to result in 
a company’s getting the data they want with no guarantees against transgressive use of it.”);  
Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 Conn. L. Rev. 815, 821-23 (2000)(noting 
multiple reasons for the failure of “self-reliant consent” for privacy on the Internet). Regarding 
the shortcomings of “information mandates” in a variety of settings, see OMRI BEN-SHAHAR 
& CARL SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANT TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED CONSENT 
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people do not read privacy notices, do not understand them, are not 
provided with meaningful choices, and lack the understanding to make 
the choices right for them.27 The Principles attempt to address these 
problems and breathe new life into the concept of notice-and-choice.   
In Part II of this Essay, we provide an overview of the general goals 
and approach of the Principles. In Part III, we provide a section-by-
section overview of the Principles, highlighting the most notable 
elements of each section and explaining choices made. In Part IV, we 
provide the full black letter text of the Principles.   
 
 
I.  THE GOALS AND APPROACH OF THE  
ALI PRINCIPLES OF LAW, DATA PRIVACY 
 
A. The Origins of the Project 
  
We began the project in the summer of 2012. The ALI’s motivation 
to start this project was due to a void in U.S. data privacy law. Courts, 
legislatures, and policymakers were struggling to understanding 
concepts such as the meaning of “personal identifiable information,” 
the nature of a privacy harm, the elements of meaningful consent, and 
the duties that should be owed a person whose personal information is 
processed, among other themes. Consistency and comprehensiveness 
were sorely lacking in U.S. privacy law. 
As the selected Reporters for a then inchoate ALI privacy project, 
we proposed more than a dozen possible topics and provided 
background on each. On September 28, 2012, we held our first meeting 
about this project in San Francisco. On that day, we led a discussion 
with a remarkable array of experts. Among the 35 attendees were 
judges from federal and state courts; an FTC commissioner and FTC 
director of a key division for privacy regulation; advocates from 
privacy NGO’s; chief privacy officials and lawyers from a number of 
prominent information technology companies, including entities based 
in Silicon Valley; and attorneys specializing in privacy and data 
 
 
10 (2014).   
27 On the reliance on ineffective “idealized consent,” see Schwartz & Peifer, Transatlantic 
Data Privacy Law, supra note 19, at 149-50. 
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security law. Also in attendance was a former General Counsel of the 
National Security Agency and a prominent Assistant U.S. Attorney. 
Finally, the discussion benefited from the participation of numerous 
academic experts in this field, including the then Dean of the Yale Law 
School.  
There was considerable consensus at this meeting that U.S. law 
would benefit from significant guidance about data privacy, and that a 
wide-ranging project in this area by the ALI would be a valuable 
undertaking. We decided to develop a new project to address the most 
important and vexing privacy problem of the 21st century—the vast 
collection, use, and disclosure of personal data by a wide array of 
entities. As for the section of the Restatement Second of Torts devoted 
to the privacy torts, we decided that while it would benefit from being 
revisited, this endeavor was not the most important and pressing issue 
for data privacy law. Moreover, the topic of the privacy torts did not 
fit well within our proposed project. There was also widespread 
consensus that we should break new ground for the ALI and tackle 
issues that specifically relate to data processing and information use 
rather than tidy up the classic issues of tort privacy.  
 
B. The Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) 
  
We began by organizing the project around key Fair Information 
Practice Principles (FIPPs).28 The FIPPs are a set of principles about 
the responsibilities and obligations for entities when collecting and 
using personal data. They also provide the rights that people should 
have regarding their data.  A set of FIPPs were articulated in the U.S. 
as early as 1973 in a report by the U.S. Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (HEW).29 The FIPPs have been restated and 
expanded a number of times. The Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines of 1980 (updated in 
2013), have included the most widely-used set of FIPPs in world 
 
 
28 FIPPs are sometimes also referred to as Fair Information Practices (FIPs).  
29 U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Records, Computers, and the Rights of 
Citizens: Report of the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems 
41-42 (1973). 
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regulation.30  The EU Data Protection Directive and GDPR are also 
grounded on the FIPPs, as is the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) Privacy Framework of 2004.31 Nearly every privacy statute 
rests on one or another of these articulations of FIPPs.   
Although the FIPPs form the backbone of privacy law in the United 
States and around the world, and although there is fairly widespread 
agreement about them, privacy laws diverge significantly in their 
effectiveness and scope.  The FIPPs alone are open-ended; they are but 
a skeleton, and meaningful regulation requires more detail. In the 
United States, the FIPPs have often been embodied in laws in a scaled-
down version – the notice-and-choice approach. One of us has 
critiqued this approach as one based on privacy policies that are 
incomprehensible to most people.32 Another of us has critiqued the 
approach as failing because people cannot self-manage their privacy 
because it is too vast and time-consuming to do as well as too 
complicated to assess the costs and benefits of making choices about 
how and when to share their data.33 As a consequence of the accepted, 
watered-down versions of the FIPPs in the United States, many other 
scholars have criticized the FIPPs approach to protecting privacy as 
inadequate.34   
In our view, however, the problem with existing data privacy law 
is not with the FIPPs; rather, it is in the approach of what one of us has 
called “privacy self-management.”35 Although the FIPPs have certain 
components that involve privacy self-management, the FIPPs also 
have accountability principles that place obligations on organizations 
regarding how they use personal data. Moreover, the FIPPs already 
form the foundation of much privacy law, and, as a consequence, they 
represented the best place to focus the ALI project. What is needed, 
and what the Principles aim to supply, is sufficient guidance to bring 
 
 
30 OECD Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal 
Data (1980, expanded in 2013). 
31 GDPR, supra note 15; Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, APEC Privacy Framework, 
2004/AMM/014rev1 (Nov. 2004); Directive, supra note 13.  
32 Schwartz & Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, supra note 19, at 149-50.  
33 Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 
Harv. L. Rev. 1880 (2013). 
34 Woodrow Hartzog, The Inadequate, Invaluable Fair Information Practices, 76 Md. L. Rev. 
952 (2017). 
35 Solove, Privacy Self-Management, supra note 33, at 1895. 
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more substance, uniformity, and clarity to the law.  Beyond the FIPPS, 
we drew upon countless privacy laws, regulations, enforcement 
actions, and cases for ideas and approaches.  
Our goal was to produce a balanced compromise, an approach to 
advance U.S. privacy law significantly while still maintaining fidelity 
to its foundations. The GDPR cannot merely be transferred to the U.S. 
There are some fundamental differences that make reaching consensus 
about certain elements of the GDPR difficult or that even make it 
incompatible with existing U.S. law. In our view, the Principles are a 
step forward that will be useful to legislatures working on privacy 
legislation, to policymakers evaluating tradeoffs in this area, and to 
everyone who is concerned about privacy law. 
 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
A. Chapter 1: Purpose, Scope, and Definitions 
 
Section 1: Purpose and Scope of the Data Privacy Principles 
The Principles are designed to cover organizational activities 
rather than personal ones. We thus focus on covering “the sale and 
provision of goods or services” and “the functioning of institutions and 
organizations, including the employment of persons.”36 The Principles 
explicitly exclude personal-data activities involving, or intended to 
involve “purely interpersonal or household relationships” and 
“personal activities.” Otherwise, a person’s contact list would be 
covered by the Principles; so would information that parents maintain 
about their children; so would anything about other individuals that 
people would write in their diaries. As we note in a comment: “When 
one individual gossips about another in a blog, for example, this 
situation is ill-suited for the responsibilities assigned to the data user 
in these Principles—such as providing notice and access—and for the 
rights provided to individuals in these Principles. Tort law and 
sometimes even criminal law are better at dealing with these 
situations.”37 
 
 
36 Principles of Law, Data Privacy §1 comment (c).   
37 Principles of Law, Data Privacy §1 comment (f).   
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Also excluded from the Principles are “intelligence and law-
enforcement activities” and “activities relating to the administration of 
the judicial system.” These exceptions are made because these 
contexts are significantly different from those of businesses and other 
organizations.38 Of course, many of the provisions in the Principles 
could apply to these contexts, and we encourage law enforcement 
entities and the judicial system to follow the Principles when possible. 
Finally, we included two exceptions to address potential conflicts with 
the First Amendment.39   
 
Section 2: Definitions 
We use much of the same terminology as the GDPR, including 
data subjects, data controllers, and data processors. We do so, first, 
because the United States lacks consistent terminology in its law. We 
also use the EU terminology because the GDPR has made EU terms 
widely known in the United States.40 Additionally, using the same 
terminology better harmonizes U.S. and EU privacy law, as well as 
U.S. law and that of other nations. An important goal for this project 
is to achieve greater consistency between U.S. privacy law and the 
privacy law around the world. 
We also use the term “personal data” for the type of information 
covered by the Principles. All privacy laws are limited to covering 
personal data rather than reaching information itself, or else these laws 
would regulate everything ever said or written, including every fact in 
the encyclopedia.41 The definition of personal data thus fixes the scope 
and boundaries of privacy statutes and regulations.  
The term “personal data” is used in the GDPR as well as in its 
predecessor, the EU Data Protection Directive.42 In U.S. law, various 
 
 
38 In 1972, for example, the Supreme Court noted the special issues related to electronic 
surveillance in internal security matters. United States v. United States District Court (The 
Keith Case), 407 U.S. 297 (1972). 
39 Principles of Law, Data Privacy §1(b)(2)(E) & (F).  
40 Schwartz, Global Data Privacy Law, supra note 2, at --. 
41 Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1814, 1866 
(2011). 
42 Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, Reconciling Personal Information in the U.S. and 
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terms have been used to refer to the personal data covered by privacy 
laws: consumer proprietary network information (CPNI) in 
telecommunications laws, protected health information (PHI) in 
HIPAA, education records in FERPA, and so on.43  Generally, the 
terms “personal information” or “personally identifiable information” 
(PII) have been used in the United States.44 Although there is no single 
term for personal data in the U.S., the most popular term thus far has 
been PII.45 However, we use the term “personal data” in order to 
harmonize to the greatest extent possible U.S. law with privacy law 
worldwide.    
Beyond these issues of nomenclature, the definition of PII or 
personal data is also one that lacks uniformity in privacy laws in the 
United States. In many U.S. privacy laws, definitions of PII or personal 
data focus primarily on data that is identified to an individual. In 
contrast, in the EU, personal data is defined as data that relates to an 
identified or identifiable individual.46 Identifiable means that an 
individual might not currently be identified but could be identified by 
combining various pieces of data.47 For example, an IP address is often 
not identified to an individual, but sometimes can readily be linked to 
an individual with additional data. Thus, under EU law, IP addresses 
are identifiable to individuals.48     
Although the term PII includes the word “identifiable,” in 
definition and practice, many U.S. privacy laws do not extend to data 
that are merely identifiable, but do not yet relate to an identified 
person. In the last decade, however, the concept of identifiable data 
has been taking root in the United States. As an example, in its 2012 
report, Protecting Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change, the FTC stated 
 
 
EU, 102 Cal. L. Rev. 877, 882-886 (2014). 
43 Id. at 887-90. 
44 Id. at 890. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 885-86. 
47 Id. at 886. 
48 The European Court of Justice (CJEU) has also found that IP address are “personal data” 
under certain circumstances, see CJEU, Case 582/14 – Patrick Breyer v. Germany (2016), at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=184668&pageIndex=0&do
clang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1116945. 
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that its proposed framework applies to “consumer data that can be 
reasonably linked to a specific consumer, computer, or other device.”49 
It held that “the traditional distinction between PII and non-PII has 
blurred and that it is appropriate to more comprehensively examine 
data to determine that data’s privacy implications.”50 Newer privacy 
laws such as the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) use a 
definition that includes identifiable data.51 Thus, the clear trend and 
contemporary approach is to define personal data to include 
identifiable data, and we have done so. The Principles thus define 
“personal data” as “any data that is identified or identifiable to a 
specific living individual.”52 This definition is similar to that of the 
GDPR. 
We diverge from the GDPR in one key respect. Under the GDPR, 
identified and identifiable data are treated the same. The Principles 
treats these categories of personal data differently: “When data is 
identifiable, it is personal data under the Data Privacy Principles and 
is subject to some of the Principles but exempt from others.”53 We 
opted for this approach because certain principles are not as relevant 
and do not work as well with identifiable data.  As we noted in a 
comment: 
 
Certain Data Privacy Principles are not relevant or 
helpful when personal data falls into the identifiable 
category; indeed, certain Data Privacy Principles might 
undermine the privacy protection of such personal data 
by requiring personal data to be identified in order to 
comply with the Principles. For example, providing 
individuals with access rights to their personal data 
requires that the data be identified to them. The Data 
Privacy Principles encourage that data be kept in 
 
 
49 FTC, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change 18 (March 2012). 
50 Id. at 19. 
51 CCPA, Cal Civ. Code 1798.140(o)(1). For a discussion, see LOTHAR DETERMANN, 
CALIFORNIA PRIVACY LAW: SUPPLEMENT TO 3RD EDITION 4 (2019). 
52 Principles of Law, Data Privacy §2(b). 
53 Principles of Law, Data Privacy §2(b). 
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identifiable form, rather than identified form, when 
possible. Regulating identified and identifiable data the 
same way not only removes any incentive to avoid 
keeping data in identified form, but also, arguably, 
forces the maintaining of data in the state of being 
identified.54 
 
Our approach encourages organizations to avoid maintaining 
personal data in identified form. This strategy is in contrast with those 
privacy laws that will force organizations to identify personal data in 
order to administer privacy rights. That approach is counterproductive 
as it will increase rather than limit the possible threat to individual 
privacy. 
 
B. Chapter 2: Data Privacy Principles 
 
Section 3:  Transparency Statement 
Countless privacy laws require entities to have a privacy policy or 
notice which explains to individuals the personal data that the entity 
collects and how the entity uses and shares that data.55 This perspective 
emerged in the mid-1990s in the U.S. when the modern commercial 
Internet was developing. U.S. privacy law coalesced around this 
standpoint, which became known as the “notice-and-choice” 
approach.    
There are two key dimensions that underpin notice-and-choice. 
The first dimension is that this approach is significantly self-
regulatory. Organizations are the ones that define their own rules for 
how they will collect, use, and share data.56 Organizations are the ones 
that decide the choices given to people.57 Under this approach, 
 
 
54 Principles of Law, Data Privacy §2 comment (c). For a further elaboration of our rationale, 
see Schwartz & Solove, PII Problem, supra note 41, at 880.   
55 For a discussion of this trend, see Schwartz & Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, supra 
note 19, at 148-50.   
56 Id. at 150.  
57 HOOFNAGLE, supra note 26, at 366. 
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organizations have significant freedom to do what they want with the 
main limitation being to adhere to what they declare about their 
practices in the notice.  
The second dimension is what one of us terms “privacy self-
management.”58 The onus is placed on individuals to manage their own 
privacy by reading notices and making choices. As privacy’s leading 
regulator, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), has stated, the goals 
are to “[m]ake information collection and use practices transparent” 
and to provide people with “the ability to make decisions about their 
data at a relevant time and context.”59   
The problems with the notice-and-choice approach are legion and 
the approach has been extensively criticized. Hardly anyone actually 
reads privacy notices.60 And the few people who actually try to read 
privacy notices will struggle to comprehend the long dense legalistic 
prose of these policies.61 The choices that people can exercise are also 
severely limited.62 Privacy self-management does not scale; people 
lack the time to review the privacy notices of every organization with 
which they interact. Moreover, people lack the knowledge to make 
meaningful cost-benefit decisions involving their data.63   
The EU’s GDPR largely rejects the notice-and-choice approach, 
though elements of this approach still can be found in some form in 
the GDPR.64  The general approach of the GDPR, however, is quite 
different from notice-and-choice.   
Although both of us have strongly criticized the notice-and-choice 
approach, we conclude that moving away from it would be too drastic 
a paradigm shift for U.S. privacy law and would likely undermine the 
 
 
58 Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, supra note 33, at 1990. 
59
 Fed. Trade Comm’n, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change, at i 
(2012), available at http://ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf. 
60 Florian Schaub,  Rebecca Balebako, and Lorrie Faith Cranor, Designing Effective Privacy 
Notices and Controls, 21 IEEE Internet Computing 70 (2017). 
61 Ted Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Information Privacy, and 
the Limits of Default Rules, 86 Minn. L. Rev. 1219, 1230-32 (2002).  
62 Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 1609 (1999). 
63 Solove, Privacy Self-Management, supra note 33, at 1897.  
64 Schwartz & Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, supra note 19, at 142-44.   
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reception of the Principles in the U.S. We thus opted to breathe new 
life into the notice-and-choice approach with several innovations 
aimed at correcting some of the defects of this approach. Perhaps the 
most important of these innovations is to bifurcate notice into two 
separate statements.   
We drew this distinction because the current approach with privacy 
notice seeks to achieve two goals that are in tension with each other: 
(1) to inform people about how their data is used and shared; and (2) 
to enable regulators, policymakers, and experts to determine whether 
an organization’s practices are appropriate and whether the 
organization is following the promises in their notices.65 The tension 
arises because many non-expert individuals can only comprehend and 
digest short and simple privacy notices. Such brevity and simplicity 
will often omit the details that regulators, policymakers, and experts 
need to evaluate what the organization is doing.  The “fundamental 
dilemma of notice” is a choice between either “making it simple and 
easy to understand” or “fully informing people about the consequences 
of giving up data, which are quite complex if explained in sufficient 
detail to be meaningful.”66  
We thus decided to bifurcate transparency and individual notice 
because these two things have different purposes, which are not fully 
consistent with each other. The transparency notice of Section 3 of the 
Principles aims to provide sufficient information for organizations to 
be accountable to regulators, policymakers, and experts. It requires 
that data controllers and data processers “clearly, conspicuously, and 
accurately explain the data controller or data processor’s current 
personal-data activities.”67 
 
Section 4: Individual Notice 
Standing alone from the transparency statement, the individual 
notice requirement of the Principles seeks to inform individuals about 
how their personal data is being collected, used, and shared. Individual 
 
 
65 For a discussion, see Principles of Law, Data Privacy §3 comment a.  
66 Solove, Privacy Self-Management, supra note 33, at 1992.  
67 Principles of Law, Data Privacy §3(b).    
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notice struggles to work effectively for the reasons we describe above.  
We thus attempt to improve how individual notice works.   
To make individual notice more meaningful, the Principles create 
two levels of notice – ordinary notice and heightened notice. 
Heightened notice is not currently required by many privacy laws,68 
but it is important for notice to be meaningful. The Principles provide 
that heightened notice “shall be made more prominently than ordinary 
notice and closer in time to the particular data activity.” The Principles 
define the trigger for heightened notice as follows:  
 
For any data activity that is significantly unexpected or 
that poses a significant risk of causing material harm to 
data subjects, the data controller should provide 
reasonable “heightened notice” to affected individuals. 
A significantly unexpected data activity is one that a 
reasonable person would not expect based on the 
context of personal-data activities. A significant risk 
may exist with a low likelihood of a high-magnitude 
injury or with a high likelihood of a low-magnitude 
injury. For a major potential injury, even a small 
likelihood may be a risk worthy of concern.69 
 
The idea behind heightened notice is that notice is most necessary 
when the collection, use, or disclosure of personal data is potentially 
harmful to people or is significantly outside the norm. Heightened 
notice should be more conspicuous, such as a “pop up” that appears at 
the moment a data activity is about to occur.70   
The timing and method of heightened notice will make it more 
relevant to individuals, pointing out to them when they should most be 
paying attention. Otherwise, important information about privacy will 
be drowned out in the oceans of privacy notices through which 
 
 
68 See Principles of Law, Data Privacy §4, Reporter’s Note 6.    
69 Principles of Law, Data Privacy §4(e).    
70 See M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 Notre Dame 
L. Rev. 1027 (2012) (arguing that policymakers should use “innovative new ways to deliver 
privacy notice” and that privacy notice should be made in a more “visceral” way).  
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consumers must sift. Heightened notice serves to lower the 
information burdens of mandated privacy disclosures. As Omri Ben-
Shahar and Carl Schneider have noted, “[P]eople strip away 
information to make choices manageable.”71 Moreover, the privacy 
practices of many organizations are quite similar in many respects, and 
basic norms of data processing have emerged, so individuals are best 
informed when there are practices outside the norm or practices that 
could potentially harm them.72    
We believe that our approach to notice, while different from the 
traditional approach in the U.S., is still quite consistent with U.S. 
privacy law.  Bifurcating transparency and notice as well as creating 
two levels of notice will not solve all of the problems with notice-and-
choice, but it will help significantly with its major shortcomings. 
 
Section 5: Consent 
A core element of privacy laws is consent. In the U.S., an emphasis 
on notice is also accompanied by a strong reliance on the affected 
party’s consent to data processing.73 The OECD’s FIPPs also contain 
a concept of consent as does the EU’s GDPR.74 As a general matter, 
 
 
71 BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 26, at 10. 
72 For a FTC privacy enforcement action that points in this direction, see In re Sears, In re 
Sears, Complaint, FT File No. 082 3099, 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0823099/090604searscmpt.pdf (2009); Daniel J. Solove & 
Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 Columbia L. Rev. 
583, 634-36 (2014); Susan E. Gindin, Nobody Reads Your Privacy Policy or Online Contract? 
Lessons Learned and Questions Raised by the FTC’s Action Against Sears, 8 Nw. J. Tech. & 
Intell. Prop. 1, 5 (2009).  
73 See, e.g., the Privacy Act, which  prohibits the disclosure of records without the “consent” 
of the individual, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b), and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA) and its requirement of patient “authorization” before release of protected health 
data, 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(1). 
74 See OECD Privacy Principles, Principle 1 (“There should be limits to the collection of 
personal data and any such data should be obtained by lawful and fair means and, where 
appropriate, with the knowledge or consent of the data subject.”); GDPR, supra note 15, at 
Art. 7 (setting out the requirements for valid consent).  On the GDPR’s strict restrictions 
placed on consent as a lawful basis for data processing, see Schwartz & Peifer, Transatlantic 
Data Privacy, supra note 19, at 143-45. 
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however, the U.S. relies far more heavily on the data subject’s 
agreement to justify data processing than the EU.75 
In the United States, there are divergent approaches to consent. A 
common approach is to view people’s failure to opt out of various 
forms of data activities as a form of consent.76 In contrast, other U.S. 
laws require people to affirmatively opt in to a data activity.77  
 The GDPR’s approach to consent is to require affirmative consent 
– equivalent to opt in.78 Opt out is not valid consent under the GDPR. 
As for opt out under U.S. law, where the law sometimes permits it, this 
approach is problematic because people often do not read or 
understand privacy notices.79  Nevertheless, we aimed to avoid 
radically altering the approach to consent under U.S. privacy law.  
 The Principles provide that the “form by which consent is obtained 
must be reasonable under the circumstances, based on the type of 
personal data involved and the nature of the personal-data activity. The 
form by which consent is obtained shall reflect the expectations of the 
reasonable individual.”80 The Principles do not embrace either opt out 
or opt in; instead, consent is left deliberately open-ended so the 
standard can evolve situationally and contextually.   
In at least one way, we have tightened up consent.  According to 
the Principles: 
 
In situations in which heightened notice is required 
pursuant to Principle 4, only clear and affirmative 
consent shall suffice for valid consent. Clear and 
affirmative consent cannot be inferred from inaction.81  
 
 
75 For a discussion of “idealized consent” in the U.S. legal privacy regime, see Schwartz & 
Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy, supra note 19, at 149-50. 
76 See, e.g., the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6802. 
77 See, e.g., the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(F) (2012). 
78 GDPR, supra note 15, at Art. 7. The Article 29 Working Party of the EU has provided an 
extensive guideline on interpreting consent under the GDPR. Article 29 Working Party, 
Guidelines on consent under Regulation 2016/679 (Adopted on 28 November 2017, as last 
Revised and Adopted on 10 April 2018). 
79 Schwartz, Privacy and Autonomy in Cyberspace, supra note 62, at 1634.  
80 Principles of Law, Data Privacy §5(f).    
81 Principles of Law, Data Privacy §5(f).    
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Accordingly, in situations involving data activities that are unexpected 
or that are potentially harmful, affirmative opt-in consent is required.  
Our approach avoids the tsunami of opt in consent requests that this 
legal requirement might otherwise provoke.82 Such opt in requests can 
quickly become meaningless and annoying when people are 
bombarded with them about matters that are rather trivial.   
 
Section 6: Confidentiality 
The principle of confidentiality is oddly often not explicitly 
included in the FIPPs or many privacy laws, though it is clearly 
implied and is a byproduct of the FIPPs.83 The Principles include an 
explicit section on confidentiality. The Principles recognize duties of 
confidentiality when there is “an express or implied promise of 
confidentiality or a legal obligation of confidentiality.”84 The 
Principles also recognize a duty of confidentiality under the following 
circumstances:  
 
Confidentiality should also apply to situations in which 
entities (i) hold themselves out to be privacy-respecting 
to gain trust of individuals who use their product or 
service, and (ii) cause individuals to reasonably believe 
that the entity will not disclose their personal data 
based on reasonable social expectations. Such 
reasonable belief can be based on privacy norms, or 
established practices.85 
 
 
 
82 The GDPR guards against this risk largely by heightening the requirements for consent to 
be valid, and thereby making it a relatively unattractive path for justification of legal 
processing.  The guidance of consent from the United Kingdom’s Information 
Commissioner’s Office (ICO) demonstrates this tendency. ICO, Lawful basis for processing: 
Consent (March 22, 2018), at https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-
protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/consent/what-is-valid-
consent/ 
83 Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of 
Confidentiality, 96 Geo. L.J. 123, 181-82 (2007) 
84 Principles of Law, Data Privacy §6.    
85 Principles of Law, Data Privacy §6.    
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By adding confidentiality to the FIPPs, the Principles close an 
important gap in U.S. privacy law.  
 
Section 7: Use Limitation 
A fundamental difference between the United States approach and 
that of the EU is that the EU requires a lawful basis for the processing 
of personal data.86  This requirement is anchored at the constitutional 
level in the EU.87 The U.S. does not generally require a justification to 
process personal data; indeed, through the First Amendment, as 
interpreted by courts, its data privacy law features strong protection for 
a free flow of information.88 In the U.S., the law regulates and restricts 
a processing of personal data primarily when this activity might cause 
harm. 
We conclude that a general departure from this aspect of United 
States privacy law would make the Principles too fundamentally 
different from the existing United States law. In biology and law, 
transplants work best if compatible with a host organism.89 Our goal is 
to find an approach that would not break radically from existing 
concepts in United States law.   
Although the Principles do not use the lawful basis approach for 
the initial collection of personal data, we followed this approach for 
secondary uses of personal data. A secondary use of personal data is 
one “unrelated to those stated in the notice to individuals pursuant to 
Principle 4 without the consent of the individuals.”90 For such uses, an 
initial consent to use the data does not exist, so greater limitations 
should be placed on such unrelated processing. It is here where the idea 
of a lawful basis to process personal data, such as found in the GDPR, 
fits quite well. Principle 7 calls for either consent by the data subject 
 
 
86 CHRISTOPHER KUNER, EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION LAW: CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND 
REGULATION 242 (2d ed. 2007). 
87 Schwartz & Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy, supra note 19, at 123-27. 
88 Id. at 134-36. 
89 In the comparative law literature, this idea is that of an appropriate “fit” between a law and 
a recipient culture.  Like much else in comparative law, the concept is not uncontested.  See, 
e.g., Michele Graziadei, Transplants and Receptions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW 441, 472-73 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann, eds. 2006). 
90 Principles of Law, Data Privacy §7.    
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or the fulfillment of the Principle’s exceptions for consent. These 
exceptions include the fulfillment of a contract to which the data 
subject is a party; the significant advancement of the protection of 
health or safety of the data subject or other people; and, as in the 
GDPR, a catch-all for serving a “significant legitimate interest” 
without “posing a significant risk of material harm to the data subject 
or others” and without being “significantly unexpected.”91 
 
Section 8: Access and Correction 
The Principles include a right for individuals to access their 
personal data and request corrections of errors. This is a common set 
of rights in privacy law, and our approach does not go in any 
dramatically new direction. At the same time, we were careful to strike 
a balance between the interests of data processors and data subjects. 
As one example, data processors need only provide “reasonable 
process to challenge the accuracy of a data subject’s personal data.”92 
It is left for legislatures and courts to further define, in different 
contexts and circumstances, the kind of process that meets this 
reasonableness standard. As a further example, a data subject need 
only provide “a reasonable basis in proof” to demonstrate that stored 
data is incorrect.93 Here, too, we use a reasonableness standard under 
the logic of reciprocal treatment. Or as the saying goes, “What is sauce 
for the goose is sauce for gander.” 
 
Section 9: Data Portability 
More recent privacy laws are including a right to data portability.  
Such a right is included in the GDPR as well as in California’s 
CCPA.94 We included such a right in the Principles as well. It remains 
to be seen in practice whether the right to data portability emerges into 
a meaningful right.  
There are many challenges in porting data from a platform as one 
individual’s personal data might be intertwined with the personal data 
 
 
91 Compare GDPR, Art. 6(1)(f) with Principles of Law Data Privacy §5(i). 
92 Principles of Law, Data Privacy §8(e)(1).    
93 Principles of Law, Data Privacy §8(e)(2).    
94 GDPR, supra note 15, at Art. 20; CCPA, Cal. Civ. Code §1798.100(d). 
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of others. This combination of data can impinge upon the privacy of 
such third parties. Yet, redaction of this information to exclude the 
intermingled personal data of other individuals might affect or even 
change its meaning because the context has been altered. For example, 
on a social media site, a person may have commented on the posts of 
others. These comments might lose their meaning when separated 
from the posts of the other users. We decided not to tackle these issues, 
as the right to data portability is in its infancy, and more time and 
experience are needed to hone this right.   
 
Section 10: Data Retention and Destruction 
According to the Principles, “Personal data that no longer serves 
the uses identified in the notice that was provided or other legitimate 
interests shall be destroyed using reasonable procedures to ensure that 
it is unreadable or otherwise indecipherable.”95 Data destruction is a 
long established principle in U.S. privacy law. For example, the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act authorizes a set of federal agencies to regulate 
the destruction of consumer data from consumer reports.96 Drawing on 
this authorization, the FTC has issued a Disposal Rule for those entities 
over which it has regulatory power.97  
More complicated than this notion of data destruction is the thorny 
concept of data retention. U.S. law generally acknowledges ongoing 
legitimate business needs, legal obligations, and archival purposes as 
requiring the ongoing storage of personal data. The approach in the 
Principles is to establish a general rule of limits on retention (“A data 
controller may retain personal data only for legitimate purposes that 
are consistent with the scope and purposes of notice provided to the 
data subject.”) and make it subject to carefully drawn exceptions.98 
Finally, we did not include a right to erasure (also referred to as a 
“right to deletion” or a “right to be forgotten”). Such a right may find 
its way into U.S. law, but such an interest will need to be carefully 
 
 
95 Principles of Law, Data Privacy §10.    
96 15 U.S.C. § 1681w. 
97 16 C.F.R. § 682. 
98 Principles of Law, Data Privacy §10(a)-(d).    
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crafted not to run afoul of the First Amendment, which continues to 
evolve regarding how it interacts with restrictions on information flow 
of data privacy law.99   
 
Section 11: Data Security 
We include data security in the Principles because we view it as an 
integral part of information privacy. As we noted in a comment to the 
Principles, “Nearly every version of the FIPPs includes protections for 
the security of personal data. Data security is one of the most common 
requirements of data privacy statutes and regulations. The privacy and 
security of personal data are related, and they cannot exist in 
isolation.”100 
Our approach to data security is the reasonable safeguards 
approach, an approach to data security common in the United States 
and worldwide.101  This approach has benefits and shortcomings. The 
primary benefit of this approach is that it is open-ended and evolves as 
standards and best practices develop and as security threats change. 
The shortcoming of this approach is that, left to their own devices, 
organizations can interpret “reasonable” in essentially unreasonable 
ways and fall short of what they need to do. This approach also does 
not provide detailed guidance to organizations about the specific 
security measures they should use.102   
An alternative approach is to provide a list of specific standards, 
an approach embodied by the HIPAA Security Rule and some state 
laws.103 The virtue of this approach is that it provides guidance and 
specificity; the shortcoming is that many organizations become 
obsessed with checking boxes on a “to do” list without paying 
sufficient attention to the quality of the substance of various security 
 
 
99 Robert C. Post, Data Privacy and Dignitary Privacy: Google Spain, the Right To Be 
Forgotten, and the Construction of the Public Sphere, 67 Duke L.J. 981 (2018).  
100 Principles of Law, Data Privacy §1 comment (c).   
101 GDPR, supra note 15, at Art. 32.  For U.S. law, see the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 16 C.F.R. 
§ 314.3(a). 
102 A recent opinion of the Eleventh Circuit aired these issues regarding the necessary degree 
of specificity in a FTC’s finding that a party committed an unfair trade practice due to a data 
security breach. LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, 894 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2018). 
103 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 45 C.F.R. § 164.530(c)(1).  
Regarding such state data breach laws laws, see Schwartz & Solove, PII Problem, supra note 
41, at 1831-34. 
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measures. Another shortcoming is that this approach might omit 
important safeguards, and if the mandated standards are not updated 
over time, the framework will lack new best practices and effective 
responses to threats. This risk of standards stagnating is a real one in 
today’s age of legislative gridlock. We ultimately opted for the 
reasonableness approach because of its simplicity and ability to 
develop over time through input from courts and government agencies, 
including the FTC.  
The Principles also include a data breach notification requirement. 
Data breach notification originated with a 2003 California law, and 
spread faster than wildfire to all 50 states in the United States as well 
as around the world.104 The Principles define a breach broadly to 
include the “access, acquisition, use, modification, disclosure, or loss 
of personal data in an unauthorized manner that compromises the 
privacy or security of the personal data.”105 This broad definition is 
designed to avoid arbitrary limitations on what can constitute a breach. 
Far too often, breach notification laws get bogged down in definitions 
of a breach that have no relationship to the most important issue, which 
concerns the threat or harm that such breaches pose.106 Our definition 
of a breach is similar to the one found in the HIPAA Breach 
Notification Rule.107 
Many breach notification laws specify specific time periods within 
which to notify. Indeed, there seems to be a competition among 
jurisdictions to have the shortest time deadline after discovery of a 
breach to notify. Early notification often does not produce good 
information because it can take a while to understand the extent and 
nature of a breach. Accordingly, we opted for a more contextual 
approach by requiring notification “without unreasonable delay.”108  
 
  
 
 
104 Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.29.  Regarding the spread of data breach notification laws, it is found 
in the GDPR, supra note 15, at Art. 33-34. 
105 Principles of Law, Data Privacy §11(b)(1).    
106 Hence, state data breach notification statutes split on whether mere “access” to personal 
data can trigger a notification, or whether there must be some indication of likely harm to an 
individual.  For an overview of these laws, see DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, 
PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 189-97 (2019). 
107 HIPAA Breach Notification Rule, 45 C.F.R. § 164.404. 
108 Principles of Law, Data Privacy §11(b)(2).    
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3457563 
 SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, ALI DATA PRIVACY   26 
 
 
 
 
Section 12: Onward Transfer 
The Principles require reasonable due diligence to ensure that 
entities receiving personal data will protect it.109 The basic idea here is 
that data privacy protection must follow personal data as an initial 
organization hires vendors, business associates, and other third parties 
to assist it and, as a consequence, shares the data with these other 
entities. Organizations use a wide array of third-party vendors to help 
them process personal data, and these vendors may use additional 
vendors for certain purposes, and the chain goes on and on.110   
The law has begun to address these relationships, and how 
contracts are to play a positive role in safeguarding privacy.111 When 
personal data passes through a wide network of entities, contracts must 
play a central role in protecting this information.112 The Principles 
addresses the issues to be covered in the contracts between the initial 
data collector and the entities receiving personal data from it.   
The Principles do not include restrictions on cross-border data 
transfers. First, and unlike the EU, the United States lacks a 
governmental entity that can make a determination of adequacy.113 
Second, the Principle’s requirements for onward transfer already have 
requirements for companies to provide safeguards, whether such 
transfer is domestic or international.114 Third, the United States 
 
 
109 Principles of Law, Data Privacy §12(b). 
110 As the Principles state, “Onward transfer is one of the greatest challenges to privacy 
protection, as accountability and control over personal data can break down as personal data 
is transferred along a chain of entities.” Principles of Law, Data Privacy  §12, comment a. 
111 HIPAA requires that there be a business-associate agreement (BAA) for onward transfers 
of protected health information (PHI). 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e). HIPAA also regulates 
downstream personal-data transfers—when any business associate (BA) transfers personal 
data to another entity, that entity is deemed to be a BA too. Similarly, the Gramm–Leach–
Bliley Act and its applicable regulations place numerous requirements on a financial 
institution concerning its selection of and use of “service providers.” 15 U.S.C. § 6802(b)(2).  
112 Daniel J. Solove, Our Privacy and Data Security Depend Upon Contracts Between 
Organizations, Privacy + Security Blog (May 5, 2014), https://teachprivacy.com/privacy-
data-security-depend-upon-contracts-organizations/.  
113 On the GDPR’s approach, see GDPR, supra note 15, at Art. 45.  On the historic background 
of the adequacy requirement, see Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-US Privacy Collision, 126 Harv. 
L.Rev. 1966, 1977-81 (2013). 
114 Principles of Law, Data Privacy §12(a). 
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government has vast surveillance powers that the law does not 
necessarily restrict sufficiently.115 An adequacy requirement might 
lead the United States to demand much more of the rest of the world 
than of itself, or set the resulting bar so low as not to be meaningful. 
Finally, this type of restriction can readily become politicized, as is 
shown by the arguments in the U.S. that the EU’s restrictions on data 
transfers to the U.S. are (barely) disguised trade protectionism.116 
Hinting as much in the antitrust context, President Barack Obama 
analyzed European investigations into Facebook and Google during 
his administration in these terms, “[O]ftentimes what is portrayed as 
high-minded positions on issues sometimes is just designed to carve 
out some of their commercial interests.”117 
 
C. Chapter 3: Accountability and Enforcement 
 
Section 13: Accountability 
There has been a tremendous recent interest at an international 
level in standards of accountability for the 21st century.118 This effort 
began with the Irish Data Protection Commissioner’s multi-year 
“Galway” initiative.119 These initial steps were followed by 
accountability projects led by the French data protection commissioner 
and a resolution on the topic issued in 2011 by EU data protection 
 
 
115 Comparative assessments of respective national schemes for regulation of national 
surveillance apparatus prove to be extremely difficult. For a comparative set of essays that 
evaluates the U.S. as well as other countries regarding a subset of their surveillance of private 
sector information, see BULK COLLECTION: SYSTEMATIC GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO PRIVATE-
SECTOR DATA (Fred Cate & James X. Dempsey, eds., 2017).  For a concise overview and 
critique of the U.S. system, see LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN SURVEILLANCE 
(2016). 
116 Schwartz & Peifer, Transatlantic Privacy, supra note 19, at 157. 
117 Kara Swisher, White House. Red Chair. Obama Meets Swisher, RE/CODE (Feb. 15, 2015), 
http://www.recode.net/2015/2/15/11559056/white-house-red-chair-obama-meets-swisher 
[https://perma.cc/A5UX-XEES]. As noted, President Obama was speaking of EU antitrust 
investigations of Facebook and Google, but his observations are illustrative as well of U.S. 
attitutes towards European privacy activities regarding leading U.S. tech companies. 
118 The Centre for Information Policy Leadership, Data Protection Accountability: The 
Essential Elements; A Document for Discussion 6 (October 2009). 
119 Id. 
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commissioners in Madrid.120 As a policy idea, the accountability 
principle focuses on whether a data processing entity has created 
internal processes that are commensurate with potential data threats.121   
The Principles require a reasonable comprehensive privacy 
program which includes written privacy and security policies and 
procedures, personal-data inventory, risk assessment, training 
program, privacy and security by design, and privacy and security by 
default.122 For privacy by design, the Principles do not specify design 
choices. Mandating specific technological design is quite a 
challenging undertaking for law,123 and, moreover, would likely face 
unified and strong opposition from the tech industry. Although the law 
probably should do more to regulate design, we were concerned about 
how to do this well while also being practical about not pushing U.S. 
law too far.  
The Principles, therefore, opt merely to require that “[d]esign 
choices and the reasoning that supports them shall be documented.”124 
Policymakers, regulators, and other actors can then evaluate these 
decisions. We leave it up to these parties to delve into the substance of 
design decisions on a case-by-case basis.   
At first glance, our approach might seem weak, but we believe that 
this viewpoint is significantly strengthened by the Principle’s 
requirement of documentation, something that other laws often fail to 
require regarding privacy by design. Any organization can claim that 
it is practicing privacy by design, but mandated documentation forces 
organizations to create a record that can later be evaluated and 
critiqued by regulators or others. This adds accountability to the 
process. Documentation showing that the design process for privacy 
was incomplete or poorly-conceived could be damaging later on, as 
 
 
120 Paula Breuning, Accountability, 10 BNA World Data Protection Report 1-3 (V. 10, 2010). 
121 The Centre for Information Policy Leadership, Data Protection Accountability: The 
Essential Elements; A Document for Discussion, 8-9 (October 2009). 
122 Principles of Law, Data Privacy §13. 
123 Despite or perhaps due to the challenges of legal mandates for design, there has been a 
flurry of rewarding academic studies on this topic.  See, e.g., WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S 
BLUEPRINT (2018); Ari Ezra Waldman, Designing Without Privacy, 55 Houston L.Rev. 659, 
687 (2018). 
124 Principles of Law, Data Privacy §13(d).    
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during a post-breach litigation. Our hope is that the documentation 
requirement will prevent organizations from treating privacy by design 
as a meaningless shibboleth and put thought and care into designing 
with privacy in mind.    
  
Section 14: Enforcement 
The Principles are purposely agnostic in this section: “To the 
extent that the law recognizes any remedies for these Principles, these 
remedies shall be effective, proportionate, and dissuasive.”125 This 
section goes on to list potential remedies and offer guidance, but does 
not mandate specific remedies for privacy violations or harms. In other 
words, the Principles offer a wide range of ingredients among which 
legislatures, judges, policymakers, and privacy professionals can 
choose. We opt for this approach because the Principles are designed 
to serve in a broad range of settings, including legislation, 
adjudication, and the shaping of internal policies and procedures.   
In listing a broad range of these possible ingredients, or factors, for 
deciding whether to provide remedies, we acknowledge, moreover, 
that an attempt on our part to shape more definitive, or harder-edged 
rules, would have created significant disagreement among the 
Members of the ALI. Hence, we place our trust in the ability of the 
legal process to work out specific remedies in an evolving fashion for 
different data processing contexts. The important overarching goal is 
that remedies be “effective, proportionate, and dissuasive.”126 
Regarding our list of factors, these include the gravity of the 
infringement, the fault of the infringer, unjust enrichment, and the 
“need for general deterrence” among other things.127    
Notably, the Principles do not require proof of a privacy harm in 
order for there to be a remedy. Despite the growth of the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress tort and the privacy torts, courts in 
privacy cases still struggle to recognize that only emotional or 
 
 
125 Principles of Law, Data Privacy §14(a).    
126 Principles of Law, Data Privacy §14(a).    
127 Principles of Law, Data Privacy §14(c).    
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psychological harm should form a basis for a lawsuit. Dealing with 
harms created by data security breaches, for example, federal appellate 
courts have issued a series of conflicting opinions.128 As a further 
example of how courts have struggled with the proper definition of a 
privacy harm, in FAA v. Cooper, the Supreme Court held that the 
Privacy Act does not recognize psychological harms as solely 
sufficient to create an actual injury.129 The Cooper Court’s reluctance 
to find actionable harms from privacy invasions is representative 
beyond its particular statutory context.  
Courts are also skeptical of privacy tort actions that point only to 
emotional or mental harms. Already in 2003, Joel Reidenberg 
concluded his critique of privacy enforcement actions by warning, 
“privacy remedies for personal wrongs are not easily accommodated 
within the existing set of legal rights.”130 A similar negative judgment 
can be reached today.  Too often, courts only recognize a narrow range 
of privacy harms and leave plaintiffs without a remedy.131 
 
III. THE BLACK LETTER OF THE  
ALI PRINCIPLES OF LAW, DATA PROTECTION 
 
This Part presents the complete black letter for the Principles of 
Law, Data Protection. The entire Principles project is more than 100 
 
 
128 Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data-Breach 
Harms, 96 Tex. L. Rev. 737 (2018). 
129 FAA v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1453 (2012) (“[T]he term ‘actual damages’ can include 
nonpecuniary loss. But this generic meaning does not establish with the requisite clarity that 
the Privacy Act, with its distinctive features, authorizes damages for mental and emotional 
distress.”). 
130 Joel Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 Hastings L.J. 877, 892 (2003). 
131 For example, federal circuit courts are divided over on the issue of whether an increased 
risk of a pecuniary harm like identity theft, or reasonable expenditures to avoid such harms, 
are injuries giving rise to Article III standing. Compare the expansive holdings in Galaria v. 
Nationwide Mut. Ins., 663 F. App’x 384, 388 (6th Cir. 2016); Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China 
Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963, 967, 969 (7th Cir. 2016); Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 
1139, 1140-1143 (9th Cir. 2010); Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 626-629 (D.C. Cir. 
2017), with the narrow holdings on the harm issue in Katz v. Pershing, 672 F.3d 64, 79-80 
(1st Cir. 2012); Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 40, 43 (3d Cir. 2011); Beck v. 
McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 273-277 (4th Cir. 2017).  For an analysis of how these cases handle 
the issue of privacy harm, see generally Courtney M. Cox, Risky Standing: Deciding on Injury, 
8 Ne. U. L.J. 75 (2016) (placing the cases in a conceptual framework).  
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pages and includes illustrations, commentary, and reporters’ notes. It 
can be obtained from the ALI at https://www.ali.org/.   
 
Chapter 1: Purpose, Scope, and Definitions 
§ 1. Purpose and Scope of the Data Privacy Principles 
(a) Purpose of the Principles. The Data Privacy Principles cover some, but 
not all, data activities regarding personal data. The Data Privacy Principles are 
designed to inform the development of best practices, to bring coherence to 
existing law, and to guide the development of emerging law.   These Principles 
can serve as the framework for laws, a data-privacy model code, or industry-
specific codes.  
(b) Scope   
(1) Covered Personal-Data Activities. These Principles cover 
personal-data activities involving, or intended to involve: 
(A) the sale and provision of goods or services; and 
(B) the functioning of institutions and organizations, 
governmental, for-profit, and nonprofit, and natural persons. 
including the employment of persons.   
(2) Personal-Data Activities Not Covered. The Data Privacy 
Principles do not cover personal-data activities involving, or intended to 
involve:  
(A) purely interpersonal or household relationships; 
(B) personal activities; 
(C) activities relating to national intelligence and law-
enforcement; 
(D) activities relating to the administration of the judicial 
system, including judicial matters; 
(E) communications seeking to promote public understanding 
or discussion, or data activities that are intended to support such 
communications, including data activities connected with libraries, 
archives, journalism, public commentary, scholarship, blogging, 
biography, satire, or the arts; or  
(F)  the public exchange of publicly available information, 
except insofar as such exchange is made for particular purposes 
that would justify the application of these Principles and is 
consistent with the First Amendment. 
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§ 2. Definitions 
(a) Data. “Data” means information recorded in any form or medium.  
(b) Personal Data. “Personal data” means any data that is identified or 
identifiable to a specific living individual.   
(1) Data is “identified” when it is directly linked to a natural person, 
or when there is a high probability that it could be linked to a specific 
person. When data is identified, it is personal data under the Data 
Privacy Principles and is subject to all relevant Principles.  
(2) Data is “identifiable” when there is a moderate probability that it 
could be linked to a specific person by the intended recipient(s) or by 
others reasonably foreseeable to have access to the data. When data is 
identifiable, it is personal data under the Data Privacy Principles and is 
subject to some of the Principles but exempt from others.  
(3) Data is “nonidentifiable” when there is a low probability that it 
could be linked to a specific person. Such data is not personal data under 
these Data Privacy Principles.  
(4) Data controllers and data processors are under a continuing 
obligation to engage in reasonable measures to review their activities 
for circumstances that may have altered the ability to identify a specific 
person. If a data controller or data processor finds that information 
previously classified as nonidentifiable is actually identified or 
identifiable, it is obligated to change its handling of this information so 
as to comply with these Principles.  
(c) Data Subject. A “data subject” is a natural person to whom the personal 
data relates.  
(d) Personal-Data Activities. A “personal-data activity” is any of the 
activities:  
(1) “Collection” means the acquisition of personal data either 
directly from the individual or from other sources, including a third 
party.  
(2) “Access” means the retrieval or viewing of personal data by the 
person  who initially collected it, or by another person.  
(3) “Retention” means the maintenance or storage of personal data. 
(4) “Use” means the processing of personal data or the making of 
decisions based in whole or in part on that personal data. 
(5) “Sharing” means providing others with personal data or with 
access to personal data.  
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(6) “Destruction” means disposing of, or deleting, personal data in a 
manner that makes it permanently incomprehensible.  
(e) Data Controller. A “data controller” is any person, organization, or 
agent thereof that engages in any covered personal-data activity and that 
determines the purposes of such activity. 
(f) Data Processor. A “data processor” is any person, organization, or agent 
thereof that engages in any covered personal-data activity on behalf of a data 
controller or another data processor.  
 
Chapter 2: Data Privacy Principles 
§ 3. Transparency Statement 
(a) Requirement. A data controller or data processor that engages in a 
personal-data activity shall provide a publicly accessible transparency statement 
about these activities.  
(b) Content  
(1) The transparency statement shall clearly, conspicuously, and 
accurately explain the data controller or data processor’s current 
personal-data activities. 
(2) When the law requires or permits a data controller or data 
processor to withhold certain information, such as trade secrets or 
confidential information, the transparency statement need not include 
this information.  
(c) Accessibility. The transparency statement shall be reasonably accessible 
to any interested person. In the event that the transparency statement is changed, 
previous versions of the statement shall be retained and reasonably accessible.  
(d) Proportionality. A transparency statement is required for both identified 
and identifiable personal data. The detail and sophistication of the transparency 
statement shall be proportionate to the magnitude of the privacy and security 
risks of the personal-data activities. 
§ 4. Individual Notice 
(a) Requirements for individual notice 
(1) A data controller that engages in a data activity involving 
identified personal data that implicates a data subject’s interests, as 
recognized by these Data Privacy Principles, shall provide notice 
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individually to that data subject. This notice shall fulfill the 
requirements of subsection (d) below. 
(2) The individual notice shall be distinct from the transparency 
statement required in § 3 and provided in addition to the transparency 
statement.  
(3) All aspects of the notice should be provided as reasonably 
practicable. A data controller’s capabilities and resources are factors in 
determining whether providing certain aspects of notice is reasonably 
practicable.  
(4) Individual notice need not be provided when personal data is only 
identifiable, but not yet identified. 
(b) Accessibility. The notice shall be reasonably accessible to the data 
subject.  
 (c) Timing of notice. The notice shall be provided to the data subject at an 
appropriate time that will enable the data subject to exercise interests recognized 
by these Data Privacy Principles. 
(d) Content of notice   
(1) The notice shall be clear and intelligible to a reasonable person. 
(2) The notice shall inform the data subject of the nature of the data 
activity, the uses made of the data, the interests implicated, and how the 
data subject may exercise those interests.  
(3) The notice shall inform the data subject of any rights provided 
by applicable law that are relevant to the data activities in which the data 
controller is engaging. 
(4) The notice shall contain information enabling the data subject to 
contact the data controller with questions or complaints about the data 
controller’s data activities. When a data subject contacts the data 
controller in the described manner, the data controller shall respond as 
soon as reasonably practicable. 
(e) Heightened notice 
(1) For any data activity that is significantly unexpected or that poses 
a significant risk of causing material harm to a data subject, the data 
controller should provide reasonable “heightened notice” to the data 
subject.  
(2) A significantly unexpected data activity is one that a reasonable 
person would not expect based on the context of the personal-data 
activities.  
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(3) A significant risk may exist with a low likelihood of a high-
magnitude injury or with a high likelihood of a low-magnitude injury. 
For a major potential injury, even a small likelihood may be a risk 
worthy of concern. 
(4) Heightened notice shall follow all of the requirements of notice 
specified above, as well as additional requirements specified in this 
subsection.  
(5) Activities regarding personal data are “significantly unexpected” 
when they are at substantial variance with the expectations of a 
reasonable person.  
(6) Material harm exists when a reasonable person would recognize 
that a data subject may suffer financial loss, reputational damage, 
embarrassment, emotional distress, chilling of activities protected under 
federal or state constitutional law, or from revelations of personal data 
that the data subject wants to conceal.  
(7) Heightened notice shall be made more prominently than ordinary 
notice and closer in time to the particular data activity. 
 (f) Material changes in policies and practices. Additional notice shall be 
provided to a data subject when a data controller makes any material change in 
its policies and practices with respect to personal data.  
 (g) Exceptions to individual notice. A data controller may refrain from 
providing notice if there is no reasonably practicable way to inform the data 
subject. The data controller shall document why providing notice is not 
reasonably practicable and include this information in the transparency statement 
in § 3. This statement should also be publicized on the data controller’s website 
home page or through other reasonable means. 
§ 5. Consent  
(a) Consent means the willingness of the data subject to permit the personal 
data activity in question.   
(b) A data subject shall be given understandable and easy-to-use means to 
permit exercise of meaningful choice in relation to personal-data activities 
regarding the data subject’s personal data.  
(c) When the law requires consent of the data subject for personal data 
activities, or a data controller relies on the consent of the data subject as the 
justification for personal data activities, these principles apply in the absence of 
a valid exception. 
(d) The data controller is responsible for obtaining consent. A data 
controller may contract with another entity to obtain the consent of data subjects. 
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(e) Consent is invalid unless the data subject is provided reasonable notice 
that satisfies the standards of Principle 4.  
(f) Consent is invalid if it is obtained in a misleading or deceptive fashion.  
(g) Form of consent  
(1) The form by which consent is obtained must be reasonable under 
the circumstances, based on the type of personal data involved, the 
nature of the personal-data activity, and the understandings of a 
reasonable data subject. 
(2) In situations in which heightened notice is required pursuant to 
Principle 4(e), only clear and affirmative consent shall suffice for valid 
consent. Clear and affirmative consent cannot be inferred from inaction.  
(3) Except for paragraph (2) above, consent can be an apparent one 
whenever it can reasonably be understood that the individual consents 
to a particular use of personal data. Apparent consent occurs when 
words or conduct are reasonable understood by another to be intended 
as consent. 
(h) Withdrawal of consent. An individual shall be permitted to withdraw 
consent, subject to legal or otherwise reasonable restrictions, and reasonable 
notice to the entity that collected the personal data. 
 (i) Exceptions to the consent requirement. Personal data activities may be 
conducted without consent if: 
(1) the personal data activity is required by law; 
(2) obtaining consent would be impermissible under law; or 
(3) obtaining consent would be impractical, or too costly or difficult 
and the use satisfies one or more of the following criteria:   
(A) the personal data activity is necessary in the performance 
of a contract to which the data subject is a party;  
(B) the personal data activity significantly advances the 
protection of the health or safety of the data subject or other people;  
(C) the personal data activity significantly advances protection 
against criminal or tortious activity by a data subject; 
(D) the personal data activity significantly advances the public 
interest, and it would not pose a significant risk of material harm 
sufficient to trigger heightened notice pursuant to Principle 4(e); or 
(E) the personal data activity serves a significant legitimate 
interest, and it neither poses a significant risk of material harm to 
the data subject or others, nor is significantly unexpected, as is 
defined in § 4(e)(1). 
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§ 6. Confidentiality 
(a) Duty of confidentiality. A data controller or data processor shall 
maintain the confidentiality of personal data when: 
(1) confidentiality is required by law  
(2) confidentiality is required by ethical standards (such as 
professional rules of conduct); or  
(3) when the personal data is collected under an express or implied 
promise of confidentiality.  
(b) Relationships of trust. A data controller or data processor shall also 
maintain confidentiality when it (i) holds itself out to be privacy-respecting to 
gain the trust of data subjects who use its product or service, and (ii) cause data 
subjects to reasonably believe that the it will not disclose their personal data 
based on reasonable social expectations. Such reasonable belief can be based on 
privacy norms, or established practices.  
(c)  Service providers and onward transfers. An onward transfer of personal 
data by a data controller or data processor’s to another data processor is not a 
breach of confidentiality if authorized by Principle 12 (onward transfer).  
 (d) Breach of confidentiality. A duty of confidentiality is not breached 
under the following circumstances:  
(1) the data subject consents to the disclosure of personal data; 
(2) disclosure is required by law, such as judicial process or a statute 
requiring disclosure; or 
(3) disclosure is necessary for the health or safety of the data subject 
or other people.  
Any such disclosures under these circumstances should involve only the 
minimum necessary personal data related to the disclosure purpose and be 
released only to individuals or entities that are best suited for such purpose. 
§ 7. Use Limitation 
(a) Secondary uses. Personal data shall not be used in secondary data 
activities unrelated to those stated in the notice required by Principle 4 without a 
data subject’s consent. Secondary data activities are those unrelated to those 
stated in the notice to the individual as required by Principle 4.   
 (b) Exceptions. Personal data may be used in secondary data activities 
based on the exceptions to consent set out in Principle 5(i). 
(c) Transparency and notice  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3457563 
 SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, ALI DATA PRIVACY   38 
 
 
 
 
(1) Notice of the specific justification for using data under 
subsections (b)(2)(D) and (E) shall be conveyed to the data subject as 
soon as practicable.  
(2) When it is reasonably foreseeable that personal data will be used 
in the future in a way authorized by subsection (b), the transparency 
statement (Principle 3) and individual notice to data subjects (Principle 
4) shall be updated to state this fact. Such additional notice shall be 
provided in a fashion consistent with Principle 4(f).  
§ 8. Access and Correction  
(a) Information about storage of identified personal data. A data controller 
must inform a data subject whether the data controller or data processor acting 
on behalf of the data controller stores identified personal data about the data 
subject. This information shall be communicated in a reasonably timely fashion 
after a request by a data subject who provides reasonable proof of identity. 
(b) Information about storage of identifiable personal data. Access and 
correction interests do not extend to identifiable personal data.  
(c) Access. Unless access can be refused under subsection (e) or (f), a data 
subject is entitled on request to access personal data about the data subject stored 
by a data controller or data processor acting on behalf of the data controller. A 
data controller must provide access or a reason for denying access within a 
reasonable period of time after the request is made.  
(d) Verification of identity. When access to personal data is requested by a 
data subject or a person acting on behalf of a data subject, a data controller shall 
use reasonable means to verify the identity of the data subject or the validity of 
the legal authority of the person acting on behalf of the data subject before 
providing such access.    
(e) Correction  
(1) A data controller shall provide a data subject with a reasonable 
process to challenge the accuracy of the data subject’s personal data.  
(2) When a data subject provides a reasonable basis in proof to 
demonstrate that the data subject’s personal data is incorrect, the data 
controller shall correct the data by amending or deleting it, or by other 
means. The data controller shall take reasonable steps to ensure that the 
errors are corrected in any copies of the personal data stored by data 
processors that have received it from the data controller.  
(3) A data controller that rejects a data subject’s contention of error 
shall provide a timely explanation. When reasonably practicable, the 
data subject may add a statement of disagreement to the record where 
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the data is stored. This statement shall be included when the personal 
data is shared with another person or entity.  
(e) Exceptions. Access and an opportunity for correction need not be 
provided when: 
(1) disclosure of the data subject’s personal data is prohibited or 
restricted by law, or a duty to protect proprietary information or trade 
secrets;  
(2) disclosure would violate the privacy of persons other than the 
data subject; or 
(3) the balance of interests between the data controller and the data 
subject weighs against access and an opportunity for correction. Factors 
in assessing this balance include whether the burden, expense, or 
security risks of access and correction would be unreasonable or 
disproportionate to the harms to the data subject’s privacy.   
(f) A data controller may not provide access and opportunity for correction 
to a data subject when the law prohibits these interests. 
§ 9. Data Portability  
(a) Data portability request and a usable format. When a data subject 
makes a data portability request and when required by law, or when appropriate, 
reasonable, and practicable, a data controller shall provide to the data subject a 
copy of the data subject’s personal data in a usable format. A usable format is 
one that is structured, commonly used, and machine-readable in a way that 
permits a reasonable data subject to use this information in other platforms or 
situations without undue burden.  
(b) Scope of portable personal data. Portable personal data is personal data 
that the data subject provided to the data controller or that the data subject 
generated while using the data controller’s services or products and that was 
stored by the data controller or by a data processor on its behalf.  
(c) Verification of identity and authority. Before providing the personal data 
in response to a data portability request, a data controller shall use reasonable 
means to verify that the requestor is the data subject or a person who has legal 
authority to make the request.  
(d) Redaction of personal data of others. A response to a data portability 
request shall redact identified and identifiable personal data about other data 
subjects when providing such data would violate these Principles.  
(e) When appropriate, a data controller may require a reasonable fee for 
responding to a data portability request. 
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(f) If only identifiable personal data is maintained about a data subject and 
if complying with a data portability request would require identifying this 
personal data, then the data controller does not have to comply with the data 
portability request. 
§ 10. Data Retention and Destruction  
(a) Scope of retention of personal data. A data controller may retain 
personal data only for legitimate purposes that are consistent with the scope and 
purposes of notice provided to the data subject. A data processor shall retain 
personal data only as justified by its contract with the data controller or the data 
processor that provided the personal data and when consistent with these Data 
Privacy Principles  
(b) Data retention for archival or research purposes. When personal data 
is stored for archival or research purposes, reasonable access limitations shall be 
set to protect privacy. 
(c) Destruction of personal data. When retention of personal data is no 
longer permitted under subsection (a), it shall be destroyed within a reasonable 
time by reasonable means that make it unreadable or otherwise indecipherable. 
A data controller that has provided personal data to a data processor shall take 
reasonable steps to ensure that the data processor properly destroys the data.   
(d) Exceptions to data destruction. Exceptions to the data-destruction 
requirement include: 
(1) a legal obligation to retain the personal data; 
(2) retaining the personal data is required to protect the data 
controller’s or data processor’s legitimate interests, or legal needs, 
including possible litigation; or  
(3) for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or 
historical research purposes or statistical purposes.  
(e) Duty to destroy personal data. If a data controller or data processor 
obtains or stores personal data in violation of these Data Privacy Principles, it 
shall destroy the personal data unless an exception in subsection (d) above 
applies.  
(f) Policies and procedures. A data controller and data processor shall 
develop written policies and procedures for the storage and destruction of 
personal data when developing policies and procedures is reasonable given the 
entity’s size and the amount and sensitivity of the personal data that it stores. 
These procedures shall permit it to meet its obligations under this Section.  A 
data controller or data processor shall also implement reasonable means for data 
destruction as part of its system design.  These steps for data destruction shall 
take into account the cost of implementation and nature of risks to a data subject. 
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§ 11. Data Security and Data Breach Notification 
(a) Reasonable security safeguards 
(1) A data controller shall adopt reasonable security safeguards to 
protect against foreseeable risks, including unauthorized access, 
acquisition, use, modification, sharing, or destruction of personal data. 
(2) Reasonable security safeguards are proportionate to the risk of 
harm in the event that the personal data is compromised. Proportionality 
is to be assessed in light of the type and nature of personal data used, 
the likely severity of harm to data subjects, the number of data subjects 
affected, and the cost of security safeguards.  
(3) Reasonable security safeguards include administrative, physical, 
and technical measures that include training of employees. 
(b) Personal-data-breach notification  
(1) A personal-data breach is the unauthorized access, acquisition, 
use, modification, disclosure, or loss of personal data that compromises 
the privacy or security of the personal data. 
(2) When a personal-data breach creates more than a low probability 
that personal data will be compromised, the data controller must notify 
affected data subjects without unreasonable delay, and must notify 
public authorities to the extent required by law.  
(3) A data controller must provide a public notice for a personal-data 
breach that involves more than 500 data subjects.  
(4) A data processor that has a personal-data breach shall notify the 
data controller as soon as reasonably possible. The data controller shall 
provide notice of a personal-data breach of its data processor as set forth 
in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) above.  
(5) The factors to be considered in determining whether there is a 
low probability that personal data will be compromised include:  
(A) the nature and extent of the personal data involved, 
including the types of identifiers and the likelihood of re-
identification;  
(B) the identity of the unauthorized person to whom the 
personal data was disclosed or who used it;  
(C) whether the personal data was actually acquired or 
accessed; and 
(D) the extent to which the risk of compromise of the personal 
data has been mitigated. 
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(6) Notification is not required when the personal data was 
properly encrypted, and encryption keys are not compromised or 
breached. 
§ 12. Onward Transfer  
(a) Limits on onward transfers. A data controller or data processor that has 
personal data may make an onward transfers of this information to a data 
processor for personal-data activities only if:  
(1) the data subject has received notice of the activities; 
(2) the transfer is required by law; or 
(3) the transfer is for uses specified in Principle 7(b) (exceptions to 
use limitation) and the requirements of Principle 7(b) and (c) are met.  
(b) Due diligence review of recipients of personal data. Before making an 
onward transfer, a data controller or data processor shall exercise due diligence 
to ensure that the recipient will protect the personal data under these Principles.    
(c) Contracts with data processors. Before making an onward transfer to a 
data processor, a data controller or data processor must enter into a binding 
contract with the recipient of the personal data. The contract shall include 
remedies for failing to comply with its terms, such as termination of the contract, 
and require the personal-data recipient to:  
(1) protect the personal data according to these Principles; 
(2) protect the personal data according to the transparency statement 
and individual notice;  
(3) carry out only the personal-data activities that are necessary to 
comply with the contract or that are expressly authorized by the data 
controller or data processor that transferred the data; and 
(4) take the following steps when transferring data to another data 
recipient:  
(A) exercise due diligence;  
(B) transfer data only to a recipient that will provide the 
required protection under (c)(1); 
(C) enter into a contract that includes the same or greater 
protections as in its contract with the data controller and that 
requires the other data recipient to comply with the obligations of 
a data processor under this subsection;  
(D) require that any subsequent data recipients do the same if 
they transfer the personal data to other downstream data recipients;  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3457563 
 SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, ALI DATA PRIVACY   43 
 
 
 
 
(5) notify the data controller of any onward transfer before it is made 
and allow the data controller to approve or reject the transfer; 
(6) return or destroy the data at the data controller’s request when 
the recipient no longer has a legal or contractual need to retain it; 
(7) train its employees who have access to the personal data about 
their obligations under the Principles and their requirements under the 
transparency statements and individual notice from the data controller 
or data processor; 
(8) devote appropriate resources, including sufficient personnel, to 
the protection of the personal data; 
(9) facilitate the data controller’s compliance with the Principles by 
cooperating with the data controller’s oversight activities. The means of 
cooperation shall include providing information to the recipient that is 
required for compliance, and assisting the data controller when 
responding to a data subject’s exercise of rights under these Principles.  
When necessary for the data controller’s compliance with these 
Principles, cooperation shall extend even after the contract ends or is 
terminated.; 
(10) develop and maintain a reasonable comprehensive privacy 
program as specified in Principle 13(c);  
(11) make available information necessary for the data controller or 
data processor to evaluate the recipient’s compliance with these 
Principles;  
(12) notify the data controller promptly upon discovery of a 
personal-data breach or any noncompliance with the contract or this 
Principle, and cooperate fully with the data controller’s efforts to 
address the matter; and 
 (d) Reasonable oversight. A data controller or data processor that transfers 
personal data shall engage in reasonable oversight of the recipient. If it finds that 
the recipient of the personal data is deficient in performing any of its contractual 
obligations related to this Principle, the data controller or data processor shall 
invoke appropriate measures under the contract to promptly resolve the 
deficiency, and also shall demand reasonable assurances from the personal-data 
recipient that the deficiency will not recur in the future.  
(e) Downstream onward transfers. A data recipient that transfers personal 
data to a downstream data recipient shall follow the requirements of this 
Principle. Unless prohibited by law, every recipient of personal data, is covered 
by these Principles.  
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Chapter 3: Accountability and Enforcement 
§ 13. Accountability 
(a) Data controllers and data processors are accountable for complying with 
these Principles. Accountability by regularly assessing privacy and security risks 
associated with their data activities and maintaining a reasonable comprehensive 
privacy program of oversight and governance mechanisms.  
(b) Reasonable comprehensive privacy program. A comprehensive privacy 
program is reasonable when it is appropriate to the entity’s size, complexity, and 
resources; the amount and type of personal data used; and the risks that the 
entity’s activities pose to the data subjects’ privacy and security.  
(c) Components of a reasonable comprehensive privacy program. A 
reasonable comprehensive privacy program shall include at least these 
components: 
(1) written privacy and security policies and procedures with respect 
to all personal-data activities.  
(2) a regular inventory of personal data collected, received, stored, 
or used that includes examination of:  
(A) the types of data; 
(B) the location of this personal data;   
(C) the need to retain it;  
(D) the protections that secure it;  
(E) the individuals who have access to it; and  
(F) the individuals responsible for overseeing its proper use and 
protection.  
(3) a risk assignment conducted before a system goes live and at 
reasonable periodic intervals afterwards to identify and to fix, improve, 
and remedy within a reasonable period of time: 
(A) any noncompliance or nontrivial risks of noncompliance 
with: 
(i) these Data Privacy Principles;  
(ii) applicable privacy or data-security laws;  
(iii) its policies and procedures;  
(B) the effectiveness of its policies and procedures and 
practices in light of the evolution of risks and the law; and  
(C) the efficacy of its training of its workforce.  
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(4) a training program that reaches all employees or contractors who 
have access to or handle personal data, and employees or contractors 
whose actions materially affect the data that can be accessed or handled 
by others. This training shall be reasonably designed to permit the 
employee or contractor to understand the entity’s policies and 
procedures and to be aware of and minimize any reasonably anticipated 
risks to personal data. At a minimum, training shall be conducted upon 
hiring or contracting and on an annual basis.  
(d) Privacy and security by design  
(1) A data controller or data processor shall analyze the privacy and 
security implications early on in the development of any new product, 
service, or process. This analysis shall be conducted in a reasonable 
manner, at a reasonable time, and with a reasonable thoroughness. This 
analysis shall be documented. 
(2) A data controller or data processor shall examine how the 
product, service, or process should be designed to address the privacy 
or security issues identified in the analysis. The outcome of this 
examination shall be reflected in the final design of the product, service, 
or process. Reasonable design choices shall be made. Design choices 
and the reasoning that supports them shall be documented. 
(e) Privacy and security by default 
(1) A data controller or data processor shall analyze the default 
settings of any existing or new product or service and how such settings 
implicate privacy and security. This analysis shall be conducted in a 
reasonable manner, at a reasonable time, and with a reasonable 
thoroughness. This analysis shall be documented and repeated at 
reasonable intervals. 
(2) A data controller or data processor shall draw on the outcome of 
this examination in the final default-setting choices that are made. 
Reasonable default-setting choices shall be made. Default-setting 
choices and the reasoning that supports them shall be documented. 
§ 14. Enforcement 
 (a) To the extent that the law recognizes any remedies for these Principles, 
these remedies shall be effective, proportionate, and dissuasive.  
(b) Enforcement mechanisms. Enforcement, if any, of these Principles can 
be through various mechanisms, including through individual redress and 
collective means of enforcement. Enforcement proceedings to enforce these 
Principles can include actions by the Federal Trade Commission, other 
governmental agencies, and state Attorneys General, as well as class-action 
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lawsuits and other civil proceedings involving the pursuit of civil remedies. 
Remedies can include compensation to injured parties, fines paid to the 
government, injunctions or administrative directives ordering future compliance, 
orders to comply, restitution of unjust enrichment, and other measures. 
Governmental decisionmakers may consider factors and elements that are not 
available to private parties claiming infringement. 
(c) Factors for deciding whether to provide remedies. Factors to be 
considered in deciding on the remedies, if any, for the violation of a Principle 
include: 
(1) the duty owed by one party to another, if any;  
(2) the gravity of the infringement; any past infringements; 
mitigation and preventive actions taken by the data controller or data 
processor, including adherence to approved codes of conduct or safe 
harbors;  
(3) the intentional or negligent character of the infringement;  
(4) the unjust enrichment of a party by the use of personal data; 
(5) the need for general deterrence of violations to effectuate a 
Principle.  
(d) Assessing the extent of the infringement. The extent of the infringement 
may be determined by assessing the magnitude and likelihood of financial, 
reputational, or emotional harm, including the risk of such harm and the chilling 
effect on a data subject. The magnitude and likelihood of harm fall along a 
sliding scale. A significant risk may exist with a low likelihood of a high-
magnitude injury or with a high likelihood of a low-magnitude injury. For a 
major potential injury, even a small likelihood may be a risk worthy of concern. 
(e) Future injury. The magnitude and likelihood of future injury can be 
assessed by examining different factors. These include the types of personal data 
involved in a violation of a Principle, the means and methods used to exploit 
these types of data, their ability to be combined with other available data, and 
the types of harm and injury reasonably expected to result. A source of 
information to be drawn upon in evaluating these factors is the known injury, if 
any, to similarly situated victims.  
(f) The role of statutory law. Statutory law can express these general 
principles by raising or lowering the thresholds for finding harm and specifying 
the kinds of harms that are remediable in different contexts.  
(1) In some instances, a statute may deem certain legal violations of 
privacy interests as harmful per se with a designated minimum amount 
of statutory damages.  
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(2) Under some circumstances, the risk of future harm from a data-
privacy violation may cause anxiety or emotional distress. Such harms 
may be compensable pursuant to statute or if recognized by courts.  
(3) In some instances, a statute may use the unjust enrichment of a 
data controller through violation of these principles as a factor in 
assessing the extent of the infringement. 
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